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Abstract 
 
A vast amount of research has documented the existence of earnings management in for-
profit settings. Nonprofit organizations are thought to pay less attention to the bottom line 
of the income statement. Earnings management research in nonprofit settings has 
therefore focused on the manipulation of expenses in order to improve efficiency ratios or 
taxable income, not reported earnings per se. Given a setting in which such ratios are not 
reported to the public, manipulation of the actual bottom line by nonprofit organizations 
is explored in light of the importance of governmental subsidies. The results suggest that 
nonprofit organizations drive their results towards the breakeven point and that 
manipulation seems to be intensified by increased governmental funding. 
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Introduction 
 
Earnings management is an important area of accounting research. Healy and Wahlen’s 
(1999) often cited definition sets the tone for several papers on earnings management. 
‘Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers’ (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p.365).  
There is an ongoing flow of literature on companies’ earnings management.1 Motives for 
earnings management that have been documented over the years include manipulation of 
stock markets (report earnings growth, meet or beat the analysts’ forecast), decrease of 
tax levels, avoidance of political costs and preservation of CEO reputation.  
Companies use two techniques to manage reported earnings, i.e. ‘real’ earnings 
management and accounting manipulation. Among the ‘real earnings management 
techniques’ are: selling price cuts, just-in-time adoption, R&D budget cuts, etc. (Kinney 
and Wempe, 2004; Mande, File & Kwak, 2000, Roychowdhury, 2006). These techniques 
are more costly for the firm than ‘simply’ making use of discretion in accounting and 
financial reporting legislation in order to adjust reported numbers. Therefore, researchers 
have directed their attention to the use of accounting accruals as a tool for earnings 
management.  
 
Recently, the scope of earnings management research broadened to the nonprofit and 
public sector. Although Healy and Wahlen (1999) use ‘companies’ in their definition, 
 - 4 -
neither motives nor techniques suggest that earnings management is limited to for-profit 
organizations. On the contrary, since economic performance is increasingly monitored by 
a society that demands accountability, earnings management may well be of importance 
in the third sector. Moreover, the growing economic importance of that sector (Marée, 
Gijselinckx, Loose, Rijpens & Franchois, 2008 ; U.N. Statistics Division, 2003) implies 
that an evaluation of financial reporting quality is relevant to numerous donors, 
governmental agencies, tax authorities, staff members and volunteers as well as 
accounting standard setters. The reliability of nonprofit financial reports is important. For 
instance, prior research indicates that donors use financial information in their decision to 
make donations to an organization (e.g. Parsons, 2003 and 2007; Tinkelman, 1999; 
Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986). 
 
Although earnings management research in nonprofit organizations is rather scarce in 
comparison to for-profit entities, a number of authors have clearly documented its 
existence. Nonprofit organizations are reported to adjust accounting numbers for several 
reasons: improving their efficiency ratios (Jones & Roberts, 2006; Keating, Parsons & 
Roberts, 2008; Khumawala, Parsons & Gordon, 2005; Krishnan, Yetman & Yetman, 
2006;), avoiding taxes (Hofmann, 2007; Omer & Yetman, 2003, 2007) and avoiding 
small losses (Ballantine, Forker & Greenwoord, 2007; Leone & Van Horn, 2002).  
 
Four factors distinguish this study from former research. Firstly, the focus is on reported 
income, not efficiency ratios nor taxable income. This implicates that the ‘bare bottom 
line’ (i.e. reported earnings) is under investigation. We contend that nonprofit 
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organizations use accounting discretion to manage results towards zero profit. Secondly, 
whereas most of the research is done in the U.S., where private donations are a main 
source of income to nonprofit organizations, this study uses data of nonprofits that are 
highly subsidized by the government. Therefore, the effect of subsidization on earnings 
management is considered. Thirdly, in contrast with earlier studies that focus on a 
specific sector, this paper uses data from the nonprofit sector in general. Lastly, whereas 
an important number of studies uses one technique to study earnings management, we use 
three commonly cited methods, creating some form of triangulation of evidence (see also 
Bouwens, Hollander & Schaepkens, 2004). 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, previous literature on 
nonprofit earnings management is briefly discussed. Then, testable hypotheses are 
developed, followed by an explanation of the methodology. The last sections contain the 
description of the data , results of the analyses and conclusions. 
 
Prior Research: Earnings Management in Nonprofit Organizations: Why and How?  
 
In contrast to the seemingly endless flow of research on earnings management by 
companies, studies on nonprofit organizations are few.  
At first glance, motivations for earnings management are less important in a nonprofit 
setting. Whereas businesses strive for earnings in order to distribute them to their 
shareholders, nonprofit organizations’ first priority consists in providing programs and 
services that are of public benefit. Profits – or more accurately surpluses- might not be 
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much more than a side effect and are retained by the organization in order to provide for 
future programs. Although the realisation of profit is -and can not be- the main purpose of 
a nonprofit organization, Deneffe and Masson (2002) report that hospitals consider profit 
as an important objective (next to output). Brickley and Van Horn (2002) state that 
nonprofit hospitals have incentives to focus on financial performance. 
In previous research, several reasons for nonprofits’ earnings management are 
documented. Nonprofit organizations seem to modify reported expenses and results in 
order to demonstrate higher efficiency ratios, to reduce taxable income and to report 
small profits or a financial breakeven. 
In the U.S., nonprofit organizations’ efficiency is expressed in ratios. Expenses are 
classified as either fundraising, administrative or program expenses. Donors aspire ‘good 
use’ of their money, which is substantiated by a high program ratio, i.e. the percentage of 
total expenses categorized as program expenses, to decide upon donating money (Callen 
1994; Greenlee & Brown, 1999; Weisbrod & Dominguez 1986).  
The importance of the program ratio has driven nonprofit organizations to manoeuvring 
expenses from one category to another. Krishnan et al. (2006) demonstrate that 
fundraising expenses are misclassified as program expenses, leading to an understatement 
of the fundraising ratio and an overstatement of the program ratio. Using a different 
methodology, Keating et al. (2008) reach the same conclusion regarding the misuse of 
cost classification. Some expenses are difficult to categorize. Activities such as direct 
mailings can combine a fundraising appeal with public education efforts. The (joint) costs 
of this activity need to be allocated among program, fundraising and administrative 
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categories. Jones and Roberts (2006) as well as Khumawala et al. (2005) find evidence 
that charities use joint costs allocation decisions to influence program ratios.  
Although nonprofit organizations usually can rely on a tax-exempt status, some of their 
income may still be taxable. In Hofmann’s study (2007), associations are estimated to 
shift expenses towards their unrelated business income in order to decrease taxation. 
Omer and Yetman (2003) find an unusual large number of nonprofit organizations that 
report near zero taxable income. The same authors conclude that nonprofit organizations 
misreport taxable income by overstating taxable expenses (Omer & Yetman, 2007). 
Finally, some authors find evidence that nonprofit organizations manage reported 
earnings to a range just above zero. Leone and Van Horn (2002) argue that nonprofit 
hospitals have motives to manage their reported earnings to a small profit. They find 
evidence that allowances of third party settlements and allowances for doubtful debtors 
are used to increase reported earnings. Ballantine et al. (2007) substantiate their 
hypothesis that English NHS Trusts use accounting flexibility (discretionary accruals) to 
achieve the financial breakeven point.  
In summary, evidence of nonprofit organizations’ attempts to manage reported financial 
numbers is limited but convincing. However, prior research is mainly dealing with 
expense classification and taxes. When reported earnings are studied, data are limited to 
one specific sector. In this paper, manipulation of reported earnings towards zero profit is 
discussed for organizations in the nonprofit sector at large. Moreover, the level of 
governmental financial aid is considered as an incentive for earnings management. 
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Hypothesis Development 
 
Nonprofit organizations cannot actively pursue profit in order to redistribute it to the 
owners and are expected to spend their revenue on programs and services. Due to the 
maximization of programs under budget constraints, it can be expected that the 
distribution of surpluses/losses will be centered around zero, even in the absence of 
accounting manipulation. Nonprofit organizations that maximise the use of funds as 
program expenses while making sure that budget constraints are met, are showing 
reasonable ‘real’ earnings management. There are, however, reasons to assume that 
nonprofit organizations also manage the reported results towards zero profit making use 
of flexibility in accounting standards. Moreover, nonprofit organizations might be more 
inclined to manage earnings when important governmental funding is at stake.  
 
Government subsidies as a reason for earnings management. 
As Anheier, Toepler and Sokolowski (1997, p. 203) point out: ‘public sector dependent 
organizations tend to find such government funding inadequate, see their dependence as 
problematic, are fearful of bureaucratization, feel political pressure, lament a lack of 
political concept and diagnose political insecurity.’ These authors also conclude that 
state dependent organizations are less likely to introduce austerity measures in the case of 
financial problems than their fee dependent counterparts. The former are more likely to 
try to increase funding by making ‘appropriate contacts at the right political level’ (p. 
203). This indicates that state dependent organizations are well aware of the importance 
of government funding and are prepared to go a long way to ensure continuing financing. 
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Verbruggen, Christiaens and Milis (2010) conclude that formal compliance with financial 
reporting standards increases with dependence on governmental subsidies, indicating a 
willingness to meet the demands of the most important source of funding. Since prior 
research has shown that nonprofit organizations manage earnings when applying for 
(increased) debt funding (Bouwens et al., 2004) and in light of donations (Frank, 
Salkever and Mitchell, 1990), we argue that earnings management occurs in order to 
preserve governmental funding.  
 
Bouwens et al. (2004) show that Dutch nonprofit hospitals manage earnings upwards in 
the year prior to and the year in which additional funding is received in the form of 
financial debt. They argue that ‘managers also have incentives to manage the books in 
order to attract new or additional funding in the (nearby) future, that is both to obtain 
external funding and to obtain it under favourable conditions’ (Bouwens et al., 2004, 
p.9). Frank et al. (1990) report a negative correlation between (lagged) reported income 
and the level of donations. This indicates that donors take reported earnings into account 
when deciding on donations and are less inclined to donating money to profitable 
organizations.  
We argue that, similar to the arguments of additional debt financing, reporting a loss can 
damage the reputation of the nonprofit organization in the eyes of subsidizing 
governments. The question might arise whether or not it is economically and/or socially 
desirable to subsidize an organization that reports losses. In the absence of and/or in 
combination with other performance indicators, governments might turn to income 
statements to evaluate the organization’s financial status during the decision process. 
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Taking this into account, heavily subsidized organizations may be inclined to manage 
losses upwards in order to uphold governmental funding. This upward earnings 
management can be expected to occur close to the break-even point as well as further 
down the earnings distribution.  
Nonprofit organizations might not only be avoiding losses, they may also benefit from 
downsizing reported profits. Most nonprofit organizations benefit from a tax-exempt 
status and a large number of organizations benefits from a substantial level of 
governmental subsidies. A budget conscious government (whether local, national or 
supranational) will monitor the results of these organizations, on the level of program 
services provided as well as on a financial level. Large profits may attract the attention of 
tax authorities as well as subsidizing governments. Similar to private and corporate 
donations, the level of subsidies might vary with reported earnings. When they do, 
nonprofits can be inclined to manage earnings downwards. 
 
Other arguments for the ‘drive towards zero profit’. 
Nonprofit organizations avoid reporting a (small) loss for several reasons. CEO 
reputation and a decrease in cost of debts are documented grounds for nonprofits to 
manage earnings just above the breakeven point. Although the realisation of a profit is 
not the main concern of nonprofit organizations, reaching a breakeven is necessary in the 
end to justify the going concern hypothesis. Being profitable enables a nonprofit 
organization to build endowments, which in turn create possibilities for the organization 
to smooth program expenses (Fisman & Hubbard, 2005) and to safeguard the mission 
from decreases in revenue. This might also affect CEO reputation. Brickley and Van 
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Horn (2002) show that CEO turnover in nonprofit hospitals is relatively high and related 
to profitability. Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach and Wosinka (2004) report that board 
and CEO turnover in hospitals is related to poor financial performance. 
Other studies have shown  that a reduction in the variability of earnings (Trueman & 
Titman, 1988) and beating the zero earnings benchmark (Jiang, 2008) decrease the cost 
of debt. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) argue that 
firms make income increasing accounting choices when facing debt covenant violations.  
 Leone and Van Horn (2002) argue and show that hospitals avoid small losses through 
accounting manipulation because of the costs associated with reporting a loss. The same 
authors review reasons for downwards earnings management by nonprofit organizations. 
Reporting (important) profits puts nonprofit organizations at risk of losing their tax-
exempt status (Weissenstein, 1997) as well as donations (Frank et al., 1990). Leone and 
Van Horn (2002) also include the negotiation power of third-party payers in the case of 
profit reporting hospitals as an argument for downwards earnings management. While 
this particular argument might be limited to hospitals, D’Souza, Jacob and Ramesh 
(2001) provide evidence for firms using earnings management to reduce labour 
renegotiation costs.  
Overall, prior research has identified reasons for upwards as well as downwards earnings 
management in nonprofit organizations. Combined with the arguments for the effect of 
governmental subsidies as a reason for earnings management, the following hypotheses 
are stated:  
H1. Small loss avoidance hypothesis: Nonprofit organizations manage earnings upwards 
to avoid small losses and report small profits. 
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H2. Drive towards zero hypothesis:  Nonprofit organizations manage earnings upwards 
when pre-managed earnings are negative and vice versa. 
H3. Goverment funding hypothesis: Earnings management increases with the importance 
of governmental funding. 
Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses: when unmanaged earnings are negative (positive), 
we expect upwards (downwards) earnings management. This drive towards zero is 
intensified when the nonprofit organization is highly dependent on governmental 
funding. We also expect small losses to be managed into small profits. 
 
<<< Insert figure 1 here >>> 
          
Sample Selection and Methodology 
 
Sample selection 
The hypotheses are tested on a set of Belgian nonprofit organizations. The arguments to 
use these data are threefold: (i) these organizations have been confronted with increased 
accounting and reporting requirements since 2006, leading to the use of accrual 
accounting and the public availability of standardized financial statements; (ii) an 
important number of the organizations are heavily subsidized, providing a possible reason 
for earnings management not tested so far and (iii) the nonprofit sector is of large 
importance in Belgium and is comparable to other open, modern economies. Therefore, it 
is in no respect a ‘sui generis’ case. 
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The 2006 accounting reform resulted in three different sets of Belgian nonprofit 
organizations. They were categorized as very large, large and small organizations 
according to the level of total assets, total revenue and number of employees. Very large 
organizations needed to switch to accrual accounting, draw up a full scheme of 
standardized financial statements and appoint an external auditor. For large organizations, 
accrual accounting and the short scheme of financial statements was made mandatory, 
approval by an external auditor was, and still is, voluntary. Small nonprofit organizations 
are still allowed to use cash accounting and their statements are not publicly available.  
To be able to calculate all necessary variables, the full financial statement is needed. In 
September 2007, a list of all full scheme filers was provided by the National Bank of 
Belgium. The full scheme financial statements of 925 nonprofit organizations were keyed 
in manually for 2006. The same list of organizations was used to gather data for 2007 and 
2008. In case of a switch from the full to the short scheme of financial statements in this 
period, all available data were gathered. However, some data with regard to subsidies are 
not available in the short scheme. 
 
Methodology 
The majority of current (corporate) earnings management studies focus on the use of 
discretion in accounting as a tool for earnings management. In these studies, three 
methodologies can be identified: the distibution of reported earnings, models of specific 
accruals (such as doubtful debts) and models that focus on aggregate accruals2. In the 
latter case, most often the Jones (1991) model is used, which splits accruals into a non-
discretionary and a discretionary part. The existence of discretionary accruals is viewed 
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as a proof of earnings management. Leone and Van Horn (2002) examined the use of two 
specific accruals (third party allowances and doubtful debtors) as a means to report 
financial break-even in nonprofit hospitals. These authors also used the Jones (1991) 
model as a robustness check. Ballantine et al. (2007) and Bouwens et al. (2004) use 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) distribution techniques as well as discretionary accruals 
models to show that English NHS Hospital Trusts and Dutch nonprofit hospitals 
respectively, use accounting discretion to report profit. 
In the current paper, all three widely used techniques are applied to analyze the 
prevalence of earnings management.  
Firstly, the distribution of reported earnings, as introduced by Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), is applied to test the hypothesis of loss avoidance. Graphical evidence is used to 
test whether an observable discontinuity exists in the distribution of reported earnings in 
the proximity of the zero earnings benchmark. This discontinuity is then more formally 
assessed using a test statistic which compares the actual and expected number of 
observations in intervals situated close to zero profit.3 Secondly, we test whether a 
specific accrual is used as a tool for earnings management. This technique is supported 
by Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) as well as McNichols (2000). The accrual under 
investigation in this paper, the depreciation expense, is specific in a sense that one single 
item in the income statement is investigated as opposed to an aggregation of different 
accruals. The depreciation accrual is however not specific to a subsector, such as 
hospitals or universities. The choice for depreciation is based on the fact that it is widely 
used in all sectors, it is subject to some accounting discretion and it is of enough 
importance to influence reported income. 
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The importance of depreciable fixed assets in nonprofit financial statements is relatively 
high. In the sample used, they average 48 % of total assets. Furthermore, other noncash 
expenses that might be used to manage earnings are less important: inventory for 
example is non-existent in 52% of the 2006 sample statements. Debtors very often 
include money owed by the government, which makes them less susceptible to write-offs 
(in which estimation and thus discretion is often the case). Since parallels can be made 
with the balance sheet of public sector bodies, the findings of Van der Zahn and Pilcher 
(2008) and Stalebrink (2007) are relevant in defending the use of depreciation as a 
manageable accrual. Van der Zahn and Pilcher (2008) find that local governments 
reporting higher deficits and surpluses had higher levels of unexpected depreciation. 
They also document a significant positive association between unexpected depreciation 
and the level of capital contributions. Stalebrink’s (2007) findings indicate that discretion 
in write-offs and depreciation is used to report small surpluses. Sundgren and Johansson 
(2004) report on the use of depreciation to alter reported results by non-public Finnish 
firms. The setting of that paper is similar to the current study, since these firms were 
recently confronted with an accounting reform that made audit and public financial 
statements obligatory.  
In order to identify unexpected depreciation, the methodology of Marquardt and 
Wiedman (2004) is applied. The unexpected (discretionary) component of depreciation 
for period t is defined as 
1,
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UDEPi,t   Unexpected depreciation for organization i in year t 
DEPi,t   Actual (reported) depreciation for organization i in year t 
TA i,t-1   Total assets for organization i in year t-1 
Gross PPE i,t  Gross plant, property and equipment for organization i in year t4 
Lastly, in accordance with former studies by Bouwens et al. (2004), Leone and Van Horn 
(2002) and Ballantine et al. (2007), an aggregate accruals model is used based on the 
Jones (1991) model and the modified version by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) 
(Hereafter referred to as the Jones model and modified Jones model, respectively).  
For the Jones model, the following ordinary least squares regression model is used to 
estimate accruals as a function of the change in the level of activity (change in revenue) 
and the level of plant, property and equipment. Accruals are defined as the change in 
operating assets (inventory, accounts receivable) minus the change in operating liabilities 
(all non-financial short term debts) to account for changes in working capital and minus 
non-cash expenses such as depreciation and provisions. Abnormal or discretionary 
accruals are then defined as the error terms of the regression. 
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Where 
ACit = total accruals for firm i in year t 
=∆ tREV revenues in year t – revenues in year t-1 
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
TAt-1 = Total assets in year t-1 
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Dechow et al. (1995) proposed a modification to the original Jones (1991) model by 
subtracting the change in receivables from the change in revenue in order to capture 
sales-based manipulation. The modified Jones model is then: 
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Results and Discussion 
 
Descriptives 
The analysis is based on a sample of 925 organizations that filed a full scheme of 
financial statements in 2006. In 2007 and 2008, 95 organizations switched from the full 
to the short scheme of financial statements, ended their activities or did not file financial 
statements.6 The organizations are active in 20 different subsectors. The majority of 
organizations are to be found in health care (476 organizations) and education (146). But 
sectors such as agriculture and forestry, business related services, hotels (youth hostels, 
vacations for disabled persons), recycling, sports and leisure are also included in the 
sample.  
 
The descriptive statistics for the pooled data are summarized in table 1. Mean total assets 
(mean total revenue) amount to 14.6 (11.3) million euro. The organizations are quite 
heavily subsidized, as is evidenced by the average subsidies of 3.6 million euro 
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representing on average 43.5 percent of total revenue. It can be noticed that the medians 
are much lower than the means, indicating skewed distributions. 
In 73.4 percent of the cases, subsidies are granted to the organization and in 82.4 percent 
of all cases, donations are less than 1 percent of total operating revenue (untabulated). 
The main sources of funding are therefore subsidies and self-generated revenue. 
 
<<< Insert table 1 here >>> 
 
Unexpected depreciation and discretionary accruals: the drive towards zero? 
The presence of earnings management is tested using two accruals measures. Firstly, the 
depreciation expense is split into an expected and unexpected part, using the 
methodology put forward by Marquardt and Wiedman (2004). Positive (negative) 
unexpected depreciation is consistent with downwards (upwards) earnings management. 
Secondly, discretionary accruals are calculated to indicate upwards (when positive) and 
downwards (when negative) earnings management. Accruals are estimated by sector. Due 
to the fact that some sectors have a very limited number of organizations, only 7 sectors 
were taken into account. This, in combination with missing data and the use of lagged 
data, reduces the total number of observations to 1498. As a sensitivity analysis, accruals 
were also estimated cross-sectional for the entire sample. 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics on both measures. The mean and median 
discretionary accruals are slightly negative and very similar in magnitude in comparison 
with prior research by e.g. Bouwens et al. (2004). Differences in accruals are very limited 
when comparing the Jones and modified Jones model. Mean unexpected depreciation is 
 - 19 -
slightly negative, whereas the median unexpected depreciation is slightly positive. The 
mean level of unexpected depreciation is lower than in former studies. Van der Zahn and 
Pilcher (2008) reported a mean unexpected depreciation level of -0.13, whereas 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) reported -0.05. Accruals are both negative and positive, 
suggesting upwards as well as downwards earnings management. The percentages in 
table 2 suggest that downwards earnings management is more present than upwards 
earnings management (for discretionary accruals as well as unexpected depreciation). 
 
<<< Insert table 2 here >>> 
 
To test whether accruals are used to manage earnings upwards when pre-managed 
earnings are negative (and vice versa), the following regressions are used, similar to 
Leone and Van Horn (2002). 
ε++++=
−− 1,31,2,10, titititi UDEPaEARNINGSaEBUDEPaaUDEP
      
 
ε++++=
−
−
1,31,2,10, titititi DAbEARNINGSbEBDAbbDA  
Where  
UDEPt = Unexpected Depreciation year t 
EBUDEPt = Earnings t/TA t-1 + Unexpected Depreciationt 
DAt= discretionary accrualst 
EBDA t= Earnings t/Total assets t-1 – Discretionary accrualst 
EARNINGS t-1= Reported earnings t-1/Total assets t-2 
 
When hypothesis 2 holds, we expect the sign of a1 to be negative and b1 to be positive. 
Since Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) showed that discretionary accruals are 
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positively correlated with prior year earnings, we expect the sign of a2 (b2) to be negative 
(positive). Lagged discretionary accruals and unexpected depreciation are added to the 
model to deal with (likely) autocorrelation (Leone and Van Horn, 2005) 
<<< Insert table 3 here >>> 
The regression results in table 3 confirm hypothesis 2. Earnings are managed downwards 
(upwards) when premanaged earnings are positive (negative), as is evidenced by the 
negative sign of the coefficient of earnings before discretionary accruals and the positive 
sign of earnings before unexpected depreciation. The coefficient of scaled earnings of the 
previous year also shows the expected sign. The explanatory power of the discretionary 
accruals model (0.714) is higher than the unexpected depreciation model (0.336), but 
both are acceptable and the analysis of multicollinearity diagnostics (untabulated) does 
not indicate problems. Overall, the ‘drive towards zero’ is confirmed by the regression 
analysis. 
 
Loss avoidance 
 
Using the method developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we examine the 
distribution of reported earnings (divided by total lagged assets) around the benchmark, 
in this case the financial breakeven point of zero profit. Graph 1 shows the distribution of 
reported earnings divided by lagged total assets close to the breakeven point (datapoints 
are in a range of -0.2 to 0.2 for the graphical presentation). The discontinuity around the 
breakeven point is visually clear. The number of observation in the interval just to the 
right of the breakeven point is clearly much more elevated than the number just to the 
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left. Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), this indicates that organizations manage 
reported earnings to a level just above the breakeven point, as suggested by hypothesis 1.  
 
<<< Insert graph 1 here >>> 
 
Table 4, panel A shows the results of the statistical analysis developed by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), using interval widths of 0.5 percent. The interval just to the right of 
the breakeven point contains a significantly larger number of observations than is to be 
expected under the hypothesis of a normal distribution. The adjacent interval (small 
losses) contains significantly less observations than to be expected.  
This observation is in line with hypothesis 1, stating that organizations will avoid small 
losses. 
<<< Insert graph 2 here >>> 
<<< Insert graph 3 here >>> 
 
Graphs 2 and 3 represent the distribution of earnings before unexpected depreciation and 
earnings before discretionary accruals. The discontinuity around zero is considerably less 
visible or even non-existent, which confirms the use of the depreciation expense and 
accounting accruals as earnings management tools. This is confirmed by the results of the 
statistical tests (table 4, panels B and C). When accruals and depreciation are used to 
manage earnings towards zero, we would expect the standard deviation of unmanaged 
earnings (i.e. earnings before unexpected depreciation, EBUDEP, and earnings before 
discretionary accruals, EBDA) to be larger than for reported earnings and means to be 
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closer to zero for reported earnings. The distribution characteristics in table 5 show larger 
standard deviations for unmanaged earnings than for managed earnings.  
 
<<< Insert table 5 around here >>> 
 
To further analyse the loss avoidance hypothesis, the sample is split into four groups, 
based on their reported and unmanaged results: small profits (losses) are defined as less 
than (minus) one percent of total assets. 
<<<Insert table 6 around here>>> 
The percentage of organizations that reports a small profit is considerably larger than the 
percentage of organizations with unmanaged small losses (14.3 versus 6.4 percent in the 
case of unexpected depreciation, 15.3 versus 4.4 percent in the case of discretionary 
accruals). This is consistent with the analysis of the earnings distribution and the 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) statistical tests. In the UDEP-analysis (DA-analysis) , 
20.6 (7.0) percent of all small profit reporters also show an unmanaged small profit. 
Almost 45 (35) percent of the small profits are the result of upwards earnings 
management, whereas 34.5 (58.3) percent is the result of downwards earnings 
management. Depreciation seems to be used more often for upwards earnings 
management, whereas the majority of discretionary accruals is negative (downwards 
earnings management). The conclusions based on the crosstabs are consistent with the 
hypothesis that organizations tend to avoid reporting a loss (H1). To do so, both upwards 
and downwards earnings management seem to be used. Overall, only 44.3 percent 
(UDEP) and 38.9 percent (DA) of unmanaged losses (of more than 1% of total assets) are 
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also reported as losses of that size. The stability of unmanaged into reported profits is 
higher: 87.8 percent (UDEP) and 76.9 percent (DA). 
 
Unexpected depreciation in relation to subsidies  
Hypothesis 3 states that earnings management increases with the level of subsidies. To 
test the hypothesis, univariate correlations (table 7) and OLS regression (table 8) is used.  
 
<<< Insert table 7 around here >>> 
Table 7, panel A shows the correlation between the importance of subsidies (expressed as 
a percentage of total revenue) and absolute values of discretionary accruals and 
unexpected depreciation. The correlation is non-significant in the case of discretionary 
accruals and positive in the case of unexpected depreciation, suggesting that earnings 
management through depreciation increases with the level of subsidies. 
Panel B presents correlations according to the direction of the accruals measure. The 
evidence suggests that a higher level of subsidies coincides with more upwards as well as 
downwards earnings management in the case of unexpected depreciation. The 
correlations for discretionary accruals are not significantly different from zero at a 5% 
level. 
In Panel C, the direction of earnings management is combined with the sign of 
unmanaged results. If the importance of subsidies drives earnings towards the break-even 
point, we would see higher levels of upwards (downwards) earnings management when 
unmanaged results are negative (positive). The results show that all measures based on 
discretionary accruals have non-significant correlations with the importance of subsidies. 
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The results for unexpected depreciation suggest more upwards earnings management 
when unmanaged results are negative, which is consistent with the analysis of loss 
avoidance and the distribution characteristics of earnings before unexpected depreciation. 
The correlation coefficients also suggest, however, that there is also more downwards 
earnings management for negative  unmanaged results when subsidies are higher.  
Overall, we find no significant correlations of discretionary accruals and subsidies. In the 
case of unexpected depreciation, an increased level of subsidies coincides with more 
earnings management (upwards as well as downwards) in the case of negative 
unmanaged earnings. This is consistent with hypothesis 3, but contradictory to hypothesis 
2. 
 
To further analyze the effect of subsidies on earnings management towards zero profit, 
the earlier used OLS regression is repeated, adding an interaction term of unmanaged 
earnings and the level of subsidies. The restated linear regressions are as follows: 
ε++++++=
−−
tSUBSiaSEBUDEPxSUBaUDEPaEARNINGSaEBUDEPaaUDEP tititititi ,5,41,31,2,10,
 
εtitititititi SUBSbEBDAxSUBSbDAbEARNINGSbEBDAbbDA ,5,41,31,2,10, +++++= −−  
Where  
UDEPt = Unexpected Depreciation year t 
EBUDEPt = Earnings t/TA t-1 + Unexpected Depreciationt 
DAt= discretionary accrualst 
EBDA t= Earnings t/Total assets t-1 – Discretionary accrualst 
EARNINGS t-1= Reported earnings t-1/Total assets t-2 
SUBSt = subsidies/total revenue year t 
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Once again, the coefficients that signal earnings management towards zero profit are a1 
(expected to be positive) and b1 (negative). However, if subsidies increase the process of 
earnings management towards the breakeven point, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms (i.e. a4 and b4) are expected to be significant as well, in the same direction.  
 
<<< Insert table 8 here >>> 
 
Although the results of the bivariate correlations are mixed, the multivariate linear 
regression shows strong results: the coefficients of unmanaged earnings are significant in 
the expected direction, evidencing hypotheses 2 of earnings management towards the 
breakeven point. The coefficients of the interaction terms are significant as well, with the 
expected sign, suggesting that the level of subsidies increases the use of accruals to 
manage earnings towards zero, which is in support of hypothesis 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, earnings management of reported earnings by nonprofit organizations is 
scrutinized. Although previous research has provided some evidence that organizations 
manage earnings in order to improve efficiency ratios and that hospitals manage reported 
earnings to a breakeven point, so far no evidence has been provided of nonprofit 
organizations at large managing earnings to (small) profits. Furthermore, no former 
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research has investigated the effect of governmental subsidies on earnings management 
in nonprofit organizations. 
In a sample of more than 700 organizations over a 3-year period, the use of the 
depreciation expense and other accruals as a tool for earnings management has found 
some support. To overcome the drawbacks associated with different methods commonly 
used in earnings management research, three methods are combined as a kind of 
‘triangulation’ of evidence: unexpected depreciation, discretionary accruals and 
distribution characteristics of earnings measures. Firstly, all measures indicate that 
earnings management occurs in nonprofit organizations. We find discretionary accruals 
that are similar in size to earlier research results and indicate upwards and downwards 
earnings management. We identify the existence of unexpected depreciation expenses, 
which are however less important than in research done by Van der Zahn and Pilcher 
(2008) and Marquardt and Wiedman (2004). The distribution of reported earnings shows 
a clear discontinuity around zero profit, with significantly more (less) than expected 
observations of reported small profits (losses). The distribution of earnings before 
unexpected depreciation and earnings before discretionary accruals do not show a similar 
discontinuity. A crosstabs of unmanaged versus reported earnings also suggests loss 
avoidance. To test the hypothesis that nonprofits manage earnings towards zero profit, an 
OLS regression was performed to establish the relation between the direction of earnings 
management and the sign of unmanaged earnings. The results show, for unexpected as 
well as discretionary accruals, that unmanaged losses are managed upwards whereas 
unmanaged profits are managed downwards. These results are confirmed by the crosstabs 
of unmanaged earnings and reported earnings, in which we see that 55.7 to 61.1 percent 
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of unmanaged losses is manipulated upwards, according to the measure. In the case of 
unmanaged profits,  12.2 to 23.1 percent is directed downwards. The ‘drive towards zero’ 
is further evidenced by the smaller standard deviation of the distribution of unmanaged 
earnings (before unexpected depreciation as well as before discretionary accruals) than 
the distribution of reported earnings. Lastly, we tested whether earnings management is 
stronger in the case of high levels of subsidies. Here, we find mixed results in bivariate 
and multivariate analyses. Earnings management using the depreciation expense has a 
strong positive correlation with the level of subsidies, whereas discretionary accruals are 
not significantly correlated with governmental financing. Unexpected depreciation is 
higher when an organization relies more heavily on governmental financing, in cases of 
upwards as well as downwards earnings management. This relationship seems to be 
stronger when premanaged earnings are negative. This is in line with the third hypothesis, 
but partially inconsistent with the ‘drive towards zero’ hypothesis. In the multivariate 
analysis, however, earnings management towards zero profit is positively related to the 
level of subsidies for unexpected depreciation as well as discretionary accruals. These 
results confirm the hypothesis that earnings management towards zero profit occurs in 
nonprofit organization and that this type of earnings management is stronger when 
important governmental grants are involved. 
Overall, the results suggests that accounting flexibility is used to manipulate reported 
results towards or just above zero profit in nonprofit organizations. However, even 
‘unmanaged’ results are already very close to zero, which indicates that accounting 
manipulation is not the main reason why nonprofits- in general- report small profits.  
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Tables 
 
In ‘000 euro Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
N 
Total assets 14 504 5 397 35 977 2 636 
Total op. revenue 11 328 5 655 25 150 2 597 
Total subsidies   3 641 1 077   7 484 2 506 
Profit/loss      371      97   1 806 2 626 
In % Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
N 
Subsidies as percentage of operational 
revenues 
43.47 % 32.18% 46.75% 2 500 
Donations as a percentage of operational 
revenues 
  2.64 % 0.00 % 12.55 % 2 511 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the organizations (pooled) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
% upwards 
earnings 
management 
% downwards 
earnings 
management 
N 
Unexpected 
depreciation 
(UDEP) 
-0.0143  0.0001 0.0684 42.6% 57.4% 1195 
Discretionary 
accruals Jones 
model (DAJ) 
-0.0134 -0.0110 0.1664 40.8% 59.2% 1498 
Discretionary 
accruals modified 
Jones model 
(DAMJ) 
-0.0127 -0.0113 0.1696 41.3% 58.7% 1498 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on unexpected depreciation and discretionary accruals 
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 UDEP DA (original Jones model) 
Constant -0.014 (***) 0.017 (***) 
EBUDEPt 
EBDAt 
0.220 (***)  
-0.755 (***) 
EARNINGSt-1 -0.042 0.213  
UDEPt-1 
DAt-1 
0.304 (***)  
-0.157 (***) 
R² adjusted 
F  
N 
0.336 
90.924  
534 
0.714 
614.935 
737 
Table 3: regression of UDEP and DA (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Reported earnings/lagged TA  
(n=1727) 
Ni E(Ni) Test Stat P 
(-0.01; -0.005( 36 44   
(-0.005; 0( 56 110.5 -5.387 P<0.001 
(0 ; 0.005( 185 83.5 7.126 P<0.001 
(0.005; 0.01( 111 143.5 -2.540 P<0.001 
Panel B 
Earnings before unexpected 
depreciation  
(n= 1700) 
Ni E(Ni) Test Stat P 
(-0.01; -0.005( 35 52.5   
(-0.005; 0( 67 69 -0.2040 Non-sign.  
(0 ; 0.005( 103 87 1.3730 Non-sign 
(0.005; 0.01( 107 103 0.3316 Non-sign 
Panel C 
Earnings before discretionary 
accruals (n= 1075) 
Ni E(Ni) Test Stat P 
(-0.01; -0.005( 35 39.5   
(-0.005; 0( 46 34 1.5355 Non-sign.  
(0 ; 0.005( 33 39.5 -0.9085 Non-sign 
(0.005; 0.01( 33 32.5 0.0722 Non-sign 
 
Table 4.  Statistical test of observed discontinuity around the breakeven point 
(with Ni is the number of observations in interval i, E(Ni) is the expected number of observations in 
interval I, Test Stat the test statistic of the difference between the actual and expected number of 
observations). Width of the interval is 0.5 percent. Significance cut-off at 5% level. 
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 Reported earnings EBDA EBUDEP 
Mean .0284 .0447 .0183 
Median .0211 .0301 .0168 
Standard deviation .0860 .1992 .1291 
Table 5. Distribution characteristics of reported earnings, earnings before discretionary 
accruals and earnings before unexpected depreciation 
 
 Panel A. Reported earnings versus EBUDEP 
Reported earnings 
 Loss Small loss Small profit Profit Total 
EB
U
D
EP
 
Loss 
Small loss 
158 21 57 121 357 (30.9%) 
13 22 17 39 91 (7.9%) 
Small profit 4 9 34 27 74 (6.4%) 
Profit 11 9 57 558 635 (54.9%) 
 
Total 186 (16%) 61 (5.3%) 165 (14.3%) 745 (64.4%) 1157 
Panel B. Reported earnings versus EBDA 
Reported earnings 
 Loss Small loss Small profit Profit Total 
EB
D
A
 
Loss 139 31 62 143 375(25,2%) 
Small loss 15 10 17 39 81(5,4%) 
Small profit 14 6 16 30 66(4,4%) 
Profit 56 35 133 744 968(65%) 
 
Total 224(15%) 82(5,5%) 228(15,3%) 956(64,2%) 1490 
 
Table 6. Crosstabulation of the number of organizations according to reported and 
unmanaged results  
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Spearman correlation of the percentage of 
subsidies with… 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Unexpected 
depreciation 
Panel A   
Absolute value of earnings management measure -0.052 
  0.146*** 
Panel B   
Upwards earnings management  -0.074 
  0.095 ** 
Downwards earnings management -0.038 
  0.156 ** 
Panel C   
Upwards earnings management when unmanaged 
results are negative 
-0.022 
  0.145*** 
Downwards earnings management when 
unmanaged results are positive 
-0.050   0.012 
Upwards earnings management when unmanaged 
results are positive 
- 0.039 - 0.049 
Downwards earnings management when 
unmanaged results are negative 
- 0.076 
  0.259 ** 
Table 7. Spearman correlation coefficients for measures for earnings management with 
the importance of subsidies (subsidies/total revenue). For easier interpretation, the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals and unexpected depreciation was used to calculate correlation coefficients. (*** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level) 
 
 UDEP DA (original Jones model) 
Constant -0.009 (**) 0.005  
EBUDEPt 
EBDAt 
0.091 (***)  
-0.437 (***) 
EARNINGSt-1 -0.023 0.005 (**) 
UDEPt-1 
DAt-1 
0.239 (***)  
-0.200 (***) 
EBUDEP x SUBS 
EBDA x SUBS 
0.581 (***)  
-0.597 (***) 
SUBS -0.016  (**)  0.021 (**) 
R² adjusted 
F  
N 
0.502 
999.289 
487 
0.767 
463.189 
702 
Table 8: regression of UDEP and DA (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1) 
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Graphs and figures 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  Zero profit 
 
Figure 1. The drive towards zero profit and loss avoidance in nonprofit organizations 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1. Distribution of reported earnings before unexpected depreciation divided by 
lagged total assets. (width of the intervals is set at 0.5%, observations are limited between 
-0.2 and 0.2 for graphical reasons) 
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Graph 2. Distribution of EBUDEP (earnings before unexpected depreciation divided by 
lagged total assets. (width of the intervals is set at 0.5%, observations are limited between 
-0.2 and 0.2 for graphical reasons) 
 
 
 
Graph 3. Distribution of EBDA (earnings before discretionary accruals divided by lagged 
total assets). (width of the intervals is set at 0.5%, observations are limited between -0.2 
and 0.2 for graphical reasons) 
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1
 Healy and Wahlen (1999), McNichols (2000), Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) are excellent reviews on 
earnings management literature. 
2
 Accruals are defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in non-cash current 
liabilities minus the depreciation expense. 
3
 The expected variance is measured as Npi (1-pi) + ¼ N (pi-1 + pi+1)(1- pi-1 – pi+1), where pi is the 
probability that an observation will fall into interval I and N is the number of observations.  
4
 A small minority of organizations has intangible assets. In those cases, depreciation is the sum of the 
depreciation expense on PPE and intangibles. The variable PPE is then corrected with the value of these 
intangibles. 
5
 All other variables are defined as in equation (2) 
6
 Therefore, the number of observations varies accross the analyses and is given in each table. 
